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I. INTRODUCTION
Spoliation of evidence is the "failure to preserve property for
another's use as evidence in pending or future litigation."' Al-
though it can occur in any civil matter, it is especially noteworthy in
the products liability context for two reasons. First, the impact of
spoliation is enhanced in products liability cases because a claim or
defense is often based, and sometimes is solely dependent upon, a
single piece of evidence-especially where a manufacturing defect
is alleged. Second, because of the unique importance of physical
evidence in such cases, spoliation occurs more often in products li-
ability lawsuits than in any other type of civil litigation!
The purpose of this article is to fully familiarize products liabil-
ity lawyers with this important subject. Part II discusses the duty to
preserve evidence and when that duty arises. Part III examines the
repercussions of engaging in spoliation, including sanctions, inde-
pendent civil liability, criminal charges, and professional discipline.
Part IV examines the defenses typically raised by defendants. Part
V discusses where this changing area of the law may be headed over
the next several years. Finally, Part VI discusses what every prod-
ucts liability lawyer should know to protect their clients and them-
selves from the penalties of engaging in spoliation of evidence.
1. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components Inc., 456
N.W.2d 434, 436 (Minn. 1990) (quoting County of Solana v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr.
721, 724 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)). See also BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1401 (6h ed.
1990) (defining spoliation as "the destruction of evidence. It constitutes an ob-
struction ofjustice.").
2. Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence-
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II. DUTY To PRESERVE EVIDENCE
The duty to preserve evidence is an absolute prerequisite for
imposing sanctions on a party for spoliation. Whether this duty ex-
ists is influenced by several factors, including: (1) when the spoila-
tor received notice that a lawsuit was imminent; (2) the spoilator's
relation to the litigation; and (3) whether the spoilator destroyed
the evidence in question pursuant to an established records policy.
A. Triggering The Duty: Litigants vs. Non-Litigants
Both litigants and non-litigants have, under certain circum-
stances, a duty to preserve evidence. Whether or not the party is a
litigant or potential litigant greatly impacts the breadth of the duty
and when the duty arises.
Courts are far more likely to impose a duty to preserve evi-
dence on persons and entities who are or may become litigants.
For example, the duty automatically arises when a party serves or is
served with ajudicial or administrative complaint. In such a situa-
tion, the party has actual knowledge that litigation has begun, and
is therefore bound to preserve all discoverable evidence. However,
this duty also arises where litigation is reasonably foreseeable, but
has not yet officially commenced. There are many situations where
there are pre-litigation communications between and among the
parties that demonstrate that, at the time of the communications,
the parties anticipated a lawsuit.4 The duty also arises when a party
is on notice of a potential action because it has a history of lawsuits
concerning a particular product or matter and could reasonably
expect to be drawn into litigation concerning the same or similar
matters. 5 Thus, the duty to preserve evidence is triggered not only
by the commencement of litigation, but also when a party is on no-
tice that litigation is "likely to be commenced. '6 Obviously, whether
this standard has been met is a factual question than can only be
answered on a case-by-case basis.7 Generally, courts decline to find
a duty in situations where the possibility of litigation is merely re-
3. Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Anne R. Keyes MacIver, Demystifying Spoliation of Evi-
dence, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 761, 764 (Spring 1999).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 550-51 (D. Minn.
1989)).
7. Id. at 763.
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8mote or speculative.
Different considerations apply when assessing the duty of
third-parties. Courts are generally reluctant to impose a duty to
preserve evidence on non-litigants because they neither initiated
nor necessitated the lawsuit, and imposing such a duty on them
would interfere with their right to control and dispose of their per-
sonal property. 9 For example, numerous courts have held that nei-
ther ordinary tort law nor a state's workers' compensation act im-
poses a duty on employers to preserve evidence that might be used
in an employee's third party claim against a product manufacturer
or other defendant.'0 However, there are exceptions to this general
rule where a third-party is already bound to preserve evidence for
another by statute, contract, agreement, or special relationship.
In many cases, courts have held a third-party accountable for spo-
liation. ,
At least one state also recognizes a duty to preserve evidence
where the third-party receives a specific request to preserve a par-
ticular item, or voluntarily undertakes to preserve the evidence and
induces reliance on the part of another."
B. Limiting The Duty: Records Retention Policies
Given the expansive, open-ended foreseeability standard im-
posed on potential litigants (and, in some cases, third parties) for
preserving evidence, many entities have adopted document reten-
tion policies in an effort to shield themselves from sanctions
and/or civil liability for spoliating evidence. However, while a well-
drafted and properly administered policy minimizes the possibility
that a court will find that discarded documents were destroyed in
bad faith, where a document retention policy is drafted for an im-
proper purpose or blindly administered, it is of little use, and may
lure its sponsor into a false sense of security.
The leading case in this regard is Lewy v. Remington Arms Co.,
8. Id. at 764.
9. Bart S. Wilhoit, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging Torts, 46
UCLA L. REV. 631, 657 (Dec. 1998).
10. Losavio, supra note 2, at 852.
11. For example, many state statutes require the retention of a patient's
medical records and x-rays for a specified period of time. Losavio, supra note 2, at
850.
12. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987).
13. Johnson v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 239
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
[Vol. 27:1
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Inc.' 14 In Lewy, the plaintiff brought a product liability action against
a gun manufacturer alleging that he sustained injuries when one of
the manufacturer's guns fired upon the release of its safety.1 5 Dur-
ing the course of discovery, the plaintiff was unable to obtain sev-
eral documents which were destroyed in accordance with the
manufacturer's document retention policy." Under the terms of
the document retention policy, all product complaints and gun ex-
amination reports were destroyed after three years, absent any ac-
tion concerning a particular record. 7 Notwithstanding this policy,
the trial court instructed the jury that it could infer that the missing
evidence was unfavorable to the manufacturer."8 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit declined to determine the appropriateness of the in-
struction because of the limited record before it.'9 However, it
stated that a manufacturer's document retention policy would be
insufficient to shield it from liability if it was drafted for an im-
proper purpose or blindly administered:
In cases where a document retention policy is instituted in
order to limit damaging evidence available to potential
plaintiffs, it may be proper to give an instruction similar to
the one requested by the Lewys. Similarly, even if the
court finds the policy reasonable given the nature of the
documents subject to the policy, the court may find that
under the particular circumstances certain documents
should have been retained notwithstanding the policy.
For example, if the corporation knew or should have
known that the documents would become material at
some point in the future then such documents should
have been preserved. Thus, a corporation cannot blindly
destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seem-
ingly innocuous document retention policy.' °
Consequently, the Court instructed the trial court on remand
to consider the following factors in determining whether the
manufacturer spoliated evidence notwithstanding its document re-
tention policy: (1) whether the policy was reasonable under the
facts and circumstances; (2) whether lawsuits concerning the com-
14. 836 F.2d 1104, 1104 (8th Cir. 1988).
15. Id. at 1105.
16. Id. at 1111.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1112.
20. Id. at 112.
20001
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plaint or related complaints had been filed; and (3) whether the
policy was instituted in bad faith.2
Armed with theses guidelines, another court has found such
22policies are not a defense to claims for spoliation of records.
Therefore, although the disposal of documents pursuant to a writ-
ten policy is less likely to result in sanctions than sporadic purges of
the same material,23 a document retention policy is not necessarily
a safe harbor from spoliation liability, and should not be regarded
as such.
III. REPERCUSSIONS OF ENGAGING IN SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
Over the past few decades, courts across the country have
taken an increasingly harsh line against parties that have engaged
24in spoliation of evidence. If the trend continues, new guidelines
for punishing spoliators have emerged, including the emergence of
25an independent tort of spoliation . Currently, the repercussions of
spoliating evidence range from (1) sanctions in a pending civil case
to (2) independent legal liability to (3) criminal charges to (4) pro-
fessional discipline.
A. Sanctions In A Pending Lawsuit
Courts have broad discretion in imposing sanctions for spolia-
tion of evidence. Because spoliation of evidence clearly violates the
spirit of discovery, a wide range of sanctions may be imposed under
the Rules of Civil Procedure, including dismissal of the lawsuit, en-
try of a default judgment, exclusion of evidence and testimony, and
assessing monetary penalties. Typically, Rule 37 provides the vehi-
cle for imposing such sanctions. However, courts are not limited by
Rule 37 and may use their inherent authority to exclude spoliated
26
evidence as well. Regardless of what penalties the court imposes,
21. Id.
22. Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
23. Phoebe L. McGlynn, Spoliation in the Product Liability Context, 27 U. MEM.
L. REV. 663, 689 (Spring 1997).
24. Scott S. Katz & Anne Marie Muscaro, Spoilage of Evidence - Crimes, Sanctions,
Inferences and Torts, XXIX, TORT & INS. L.J., 50 (Fall 1993).
25. The trend to adopt a "new" tort of spoliation continues. As recently as
December of 1999, the Montana Supreme Court adopted as an independent cause
of action the torts of intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence. See Oliver v.
Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 11 (Mont. 1999).
26. Lawrence Solum & Steven Marzen, Truth & Uncertainty: Legal Control of the
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L. J. 1086, 1096 n.50 (1987) (summarizing cases
[Vol. 27:1
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its decision will not be reversed unless it abuses its discretion-a
standard which is met only when it is clear that no reasonable per-
son would agree with the trial court's assessment of what sanctions
are appropriate.27
1. Dismissal/Default Judgment
One of the most severe sanctions within the court's power
when a party spoliates evidence is dismissal of the entire action or
entry of a default judgment." Because this sanction is so extreme,
it is reserved for only the most egregious offenses, and may not be
imposed if there is a lesser, but equally efficient remedy available. 29
However, courts have not hesitated to impose this penalty against
flagrant spoliators. 30
For example, in Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Am. Fundware,3' the
plaintiff filed a complaint against American Fundware alleging
copyright infringement and unfair competition. After the com-
plaint was filed, American Fundware destroyed the source code for
the computer program in question. The court held that the de-
struction was intentional and entered judgment against American
32Fundware. Although less common, the same penalty has been
imposed against plaintiffs who spoliate evidence as well. In Mar-
rocco v. General Motors Corp.,33 the Seventh Circuit dismissed the
plaintiffs' products liability claim where the plaintiffs' experts se-
cretly conducted "private" tests which resulted in damage to the al-
legedly defective vehicle, in direct contravention of the court's ear-
applying the "inherent power" doctrine in the spoliation context). See also Patton
v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995) (noting that Minnesota
courts may exercise their "inherent power" in spoliation cases).
27. Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119 (quoting Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966
F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1992)).
28. Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 552 (D. Minn. 1989).
29. Id.; see also Henry v. Joseph, No. C2-98-181, 1998 WL 481932, at *4 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1998) ("The power to sanction must be tempered by the duty to
impose the least restrictive sanction available under the circumstances") (quoting
Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 507 N.W.2d 527, 533 (N.D. 1993))
30. E.g., Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 220 (7" Cir.
1992) (dismissing one claim in consolidated appeal; entering default judgment
against defendant on the other claim); Cabinetware, Inc. v. Sullivan, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d 1686, 1686 (E.D.Cal. 1991) (defaultjudgment); Computer Assoc. Int'l
v. Am. Fundware, 133 F.R.D. 166, 170 (D. Colo. 1990) (same); Telectron, Inc. v.
Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 109 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (same).
31. Computer Assoc. Int'l, supra note 30.
32. Id. at 170.
33. Marrococo, supra note 30..
2000]
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lier protective order. Consequently, parties that intentionally spo-
liate evidence do so at considerable peril to their case.
2. Exclusion Of Evidence And Related Testimony
Although courts are typically reluctant to dismiss a case or en-
ter a default judgment on the basis of spoliated evidence, they of-
ten achieve the same result by excluding spoliated evidence and
any testimony related to such evidence at trial. This sanction can
be especially devastating in a products liability case where the plain-
tiff is relying almost exclusively on expert testimony concerning a
single piece of evidence to prove his or her case. For example, in
Patton v. Newmar Corp.,34 the plaintiffs brought a personal injury ac-
tion for injuries Mrs. Patton sustained when she fell from a motor
home that they alleged was defectively designed by the defendant
manufacturer. Due to the plaintiffs' negligence, the motor home
was lost between the time of her injury and the time of trial,
thereby precluding the defendant from examining the vehicle to
determine whether certain "modifications" that the plaintiffs made
to the vehicle were actually the cause of her injuries. 5 As a result,
the trial court decided to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs'
36
expert who had reviewed the motor home. Without the testi-
mony, the plaintiffs could not survive the defendant's summary
judgment motion and the case was dismissed 7 Although the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the
grounds that it had a duty to impose a less restrictive sanction than
dismissal,38 the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the trial
court's grant of summary judgment because "dismissal was not itself
a sanction, but only the inevitable consequence of the plaintiffs'
failure, without evidence of the physical condition of the product
itself, to raise genuine issues of material fact with regard to their
claim of design defect liability. ,
39
34. 538 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn. 1995).
35. Id. at 117-18.
36. Id. at 118.
37. Id.
38. 520 N.W.2d 4, 8 (citing Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76,
79 (3rd Cir. 1994); Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 267-68 (8" Cir. 1993);
Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 550 (D. Minn. 1989); Nevada Power v.
Fluor Ill., 837 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Nev. 1992); Stubli v. Big D Int'l Trucks Inc., 810
P.2d 785, 786 (Nev. 1991)).
39. 538 N.W.2d at 118.
[Vol. 27:1
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3. Adverse Evidentiary Inference
Since the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on most issues,
exclusion of evidence is generally not an effective remedy where a
defendant destroys evidence, unless the evidence is strictly relevant
to an affirmative defense upon which the defendant bears the bur-
den of proof. In the more typical situation where a defendant de-
stroys or conceals evidence critical to the plaintiffs case, courts of-
ten choose to draw an adverse inference against the spoliator. °
Under this scenario, the party bearing the burden of proof is al-
lowed to introduce evidence of the allegedly destroyed materials.• • 41
The opposing party may then rebut this evidence. If the opposing
party fails at rebuttal, the judge may instruct the jury to infer that
42the destroyed evidence would be unfavorable to the spoliator.
The justification for this inference is two-fold: first, if the litigant
destroys evidence, it is likely that the evidence was detrimental; and
second, it deters spoliation by placing the risk of an adverse judg-
43ment on the spoliator. Moreover, the spoliation inference pro-
tects the victim by remedying the wrong committed by the spolia-
tor.
4. Monetary Sanctions
Finally, courts may also require spoliators to pay monetary
sanctions for their destruction or concealment of evidence. These
monetary sanctions may reflect (1) the fees and costs for investigat-
ing, researching, preparing, and arguing evidentiary motions and
motions for sanctions, (2) the fees and costs of depositions, inter-
rogatories, and supplemental discovery costs associated with willful
concealment; and (3) the unnecessary consumption of the court's44
time and resources. In especially egregious cases of misconduct,
40. In fact, the Eighth Circuit has held that it is improper for the trial court
not to draw an inference against the spoliator. Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers Org.,
687 F.2d 1173, 1199 (8" Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937, 937 (1983).
41. State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa 1974).
42. Id. (noting that the appellate court found error in the trial court's failure
to give a jury instruction "that spoliation of evidence creates an inference that the
evidence would not have supported the charge against" the party opposite the spo-
liator). See also Vazquez-Corales v. Sea-Land Serv., 172 F.R.D. 10, 15 (D.P.R. 1997);
Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lawnsdail,
15 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 1944).
43. Nation-wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib. Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218
(1" Cir. 1982).
44. Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 552-53 (D. Minn. 1989); see also
2000]
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these monetary sanctions may be even be multiplied in order to
41
adequately punish the spoliator and deter further transgressions.
Thus, the monetary penalties levied against spoliators can be sub-
stantial. For example, in In re Prudential Co. of America Sales Litiga-
46
tion, the court imposed a $1 million sanction against Prudential
for failing to adequately preserve evidence pursuant to a court or-
der, even though its conduct was not intentional.47
B. Independent Civil Liability
Aside from traditional spoliation remedies, an increasing
number of states are beginning to recognize independent claims
for spoliation of evidence-either in tort or for breach of contract.
In addition, other existing causes of action may also serve as a basis
for liability.
1. Spoliation Tort
As yet, no independent claim for spoliation of evidence exists
under federal law. 4' However, spoliation has been recognized as a
distinct tort in several state jurisdictions based on either negligence
or intentional misconduct. Although Minnesota is not among
them, the Minnesota Supreme Court has left the door open for
adopting either of these causes of action in the future.
a. Intentional Spoliation
California became the first state to recognize an independent
cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence in Smith v. Su-
perior Court.4 9 In Smith, the plaintiff was injured by another vehicle's
wheel that flew off the vehicle and crashed through her wind-
shield.50 The dealer who sold the car retained the wheel, promising
Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 558-59 (N.D.Cal.
1987).
45. Capellupo, supra note 44 at 553 (multiplying attorney's fees for all motions
touching upon the issue of document destruction by a factor of two).
46. 169 F.R.D. 598, 617.
47. Similarly, in a recent case involving another corporate defendant, DuPont
was required to pay $1.5 million in fines and lawyers' fees for intentionally with-
holding evidence. Rolin P. Bissel & James L. Holston, Spoliation of Evidence: Recent
Expansion of an Old Theory, Washington Legal Foundation, Contemporary Legal
Notes Series, No. 29 (Sept. 1998).
48. Kinsler & Maclver, supra note 3, at 777.
49. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
50. Id. at 831.
[Vol. 27:1
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to allow the plaintiffs experts to examine it.5 ' The dealer then lost
or destroyed the wheel and the vehicle, and the plaintiff sued the
dealer for intentionally destroying the evidence. 2 Adopting the
tort of intentional spoliation, the California Court of Appeals ex-
plained that "a prospective civil action.. .is a valuable 'probable ex-
pectancy' that the court must protect from the kind of interference" 53
alleged herein. The California Supreme Court has since over-
ruled the Court of Appeals' holding and no longer recognizes this
tort, but several other states have adopted a cause of action for in-
tentional spoliation of evidence in the wake of Smith.54 Although
the elements of this tort vary from state to state, the following ele-
ments are often considered:
1) pending or probable civil litigation;
2) knowledge by the spoliator that litigation is pending or
probable;
3) willful destruction of evidence;
4) intent to interfere with the victim's prospective civil suit;
5) a causal relationship between the evidence destruction and
inability to prove the lawsuit; and
6) damages.
b. Negligent Spoliation
California also became the first jurisdiction to recognize the
tort of negligent spoliation in Velasco v. Commercial Building Mainte-
nance Co. In Velasco, an exploding bottle injured the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs attorney put the bottle fragments in a paper bag on
his desk. That night, the building maintenance company disposed
of the bag while cleaning the attorney's office. The plaintiff then
sued the building maintenance company for negligent spoliation of
evidence. Following the reasoning of Smith, the California Court of
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 837.
54. E.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986),
St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Fos-
ter v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F.Supp. 831, 836 (D.Kan. 1992), DeLaughter
v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So.2d 818, 823 (Miss. 1992), Oliver v. Stinson
Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 11 (Mont. 1999); Viviano v. CBS Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 185
(N.M. 1995); Smith v. HowardJohnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1037 (Ohio 1993).
55. Wilhoit, supra note 9, at 644 (noting that courts in Kansas, New Jersey,
New Mexico, and Ohio have settled on these elements).
56. 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
2000]
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Appeals permitted the claim.57 Since Velasco, a handful of other
states have also adopted a cause of action for negligent spoliation• 58 596F •6
of evidence, including Florida, Idaho, 9 Montana, and Illinois.
The elements of this cause of action are:
1) the existence of a potential civil action;
2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence relevant to
the potential action;
3) destruction of that evidence;
4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit;
5) a causal relationship between the destruction and inability
to prove the lawsuit;
6) damages. 2
c. Minnesota Remains Undecided
Although not adopted as a separate tort in Minnesota, negli-
gent and intentional spoliation were discussed in Federated Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components.63 In Federated, a fire occurred at
a facility owned by the defendant (Litchfield) that destroyed prop-
erty owned by a third party. The third party's insurer, Federated,
paid the value of the destroyed property and then retained an in-
vestigator to determine the cause of the fire. In the meantime,
Litchfield hired an investigator of its own and removed part of the
evidence to a warehouse. The evidence was subsequently de-
stroyed. Believing that the spoliation nullified its subrogation claim
against Litchfield, Federated ceased pursuing its subrogation claim
and asserted new causes of action against Litchfield for both negli-
gent and intentional spoliation of evidence. After reviewing several
cases in other jurisdictions that considered similar claims, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court declined to decide whether or not to recog-
nize either cause of action. According to the court, Federated's
claims were premature because resolution of Federated's underly-
ing subrogation claim was necessary to demonstrate actual harm
57. At the present time, this cause of action is suspect but remains viable in
California because the California Supreme Court has not expressly rejected it.
58. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
59. Murray v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 101, 106 (Idaho 1990)
60. Oliver v. Stinson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999).
61. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. 597 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1992).
62. Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
63. 456 N.W.2d 434, 434 (Minn. 1990).
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and prevent speculative recovery.64 Thus, it remains uncertain
whether spoliation of evidence is cognizable as an independent tort
claim in Minnesota.
2. Other Tort Actions
The Supreme Court's opinion in Federated Mutual suggests that
other, existing causes of action may also provide a basis for liability
of spoliation of evidence. According to the court, "an action for
negligent spoliation could be stated under existing law without cre-
ating a new tort. "6 For example, the court noted that, as an agent
of Litchfield and custodian of the evidence, the law firm represent-. • , . . ... 66
ing Litchfield's insurer could be joined in a bailment action. On
similar grounds, a law firm that loses or mishandles evidence that
has a bearing on a claim or defense asserted by its client might be
liable for legal malpractice. Consequently, even if a given jurisdic-
tion does not recognize a discrete cause of action for negligent
and/or intentional spoliation, parties that mishandle, conceal, or
destroy evidence may be independently liable under other theories
as well.
3. Breach Of Contract
A Florida court has allowed a plaintiff to proceed with a breach
of contract spoliation action. In Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co.,6 s the plain-
tiff brought an action against her insurer for breaching a promise
to return her wrecked automobile. The plaintiff planned to use
the automobile as evidence in a products liability action against the
manufacturer. Allstate had promised to preserve the automobile
and make it available to the plaintiffs experts. In breach of that
agreement, Allstate sold the car to a salvage yard. As a result, the
plaintiff was precluded from bringing her products action. The
Florida Court of Appeals remanded the action to the trial court for
fact finding on breach of contract, recognizing that a breach of
contract spoliation action is as viable as a spoliation action in tort.
Although it does not appear that any other states have expressly
64. Id. at 439.
65. Id. at 436.
66. Id. at 437.
67. Scott S. Katz & Donna B. Wood, Spoliation of Evidence: Let the Insurer Beware
(Feb. 24, 1995) at 24.
68. 573 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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expressly recognized such a claim, this is probably due to lack of
opportunity more than any doctrinal disinclination to do so.
C. Criminal Charges
Acts of spoliation are also punishable by criminal sanctions in
several states.6 For example, Minnesota Statatues section 609.63,
subd. 1 (7) provides that it is unlawful for anyone, "with intent to in-
jure or defraud,... [to] destroy a writing or object to prevent it from
being produced at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding authorized• 170
by law." Violation of this provision is a felony. Persons who are
found guilty "may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000 or
both."
For the time being, however, the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion for spoliation of evidence in the civil arena appears to be more
theoretical than real. Prosecutors are reluctant to pursue spolia-
tion charges because their "[p]rosecutorial resources would risk
quick depletion if abuses in civil proceedings-even the most fla-
grant ones-were the subject of criminal prosecutions."7 Even if
they were inclined to investigate such charges, the vast majority of
spoliation statutes, unlike Minnesota's, only apply to the destruc-
tion of evidence in a criminal proceeding.3 As a result, there have
been no reported criminal convictions for the spoliation of evi-
dence in civil litigation. 4  Moreover, in many states, the punish-
ment for destroying evidence is relatively modest, and violators are
only guilty of a misdemeanor.75
Nevertheless, criminal penalties for spoliation should not be
totally disregarded. In a 1990 opinion, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reminded litigants of the possibility of criminal penalties for
spoliation in the context of a civil suit.76 Moreover, in United States
v. Lundwall,77 a case arising out of the infamous Texaco race dis-
69. For a comprehensive listing of relevant statutes in various states, see
McGlynn, supra note 23, at 668.
70. MINN. STAT. § 609.63, subd. 1(7) advisory committee comment.
71. MINN. STAT. § 609.63, subd. 1(7).
72. United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp.2d 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
73. Losavio, supra note 2, at 867.
74. Katz & Wood, supra note 68, at 29.
75. McGlynn, supra note 23, at 669.
76. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components Inc., 456
N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990).
77. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp.2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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crimination class action lawsuit, the court ruled that individuals
who intentionally destroy or conceal documents during civil litiga-
tion may be prosecuted under federal law for obstruction of jus-
78
tice. Thus, it is possible, although not likely, that the current
trend toward imposing stiffer penalties for spoliation may eventu-
ally spill over into the criminal arena.
D. Professional Discipline
A lawyer's intentional destruction of relevant evidence is con-
sidered highly unethical by the courts. 79 Thus, attorneys who en-
gage or assist in the spoliation of evidence are subject to profes-
sional discipline in addition to other penalties.8 ° Under Model
Rule 3.4 "A lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party's
access to evidence or unilaterally alter, destroy or conceal a docu-
ment or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer
shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.""'
Although misconduct charges under this provision are rare,
breach of Rule 3.4 can result in serious sanctions, including dis-
82 81barment. For example, in In re Zeiger, the D.C. Court of Appeals
suspended an attorney from practicing law for 60 days where he al-
tered physician reports before turning them over to the other side.
Moreover, even if misconduct does not result in professional disci-
pline, attorneys who spoliate evidence may also be subject to mal-
practice liability if their misconduct results in sanctions that finan-
814cially penalize their client or harm their client's case.
Consequently, attorneys who spoliate evidence do so at consider-
able peril to themselves as well as their clients.
78. Id. Although the government was allowed to pursue its case, the defen-
dants in Lundwall were ultimately acquitted.
79. In re Williams, 23 N.W.2d 4, 9 (Minn. 1946) ("The wilful participation by
an attorney in the destruction or suppression of evidence which he knows may be
required upon a trial, hearing, or other legal proceedings constitutes a breach of
professional duty and subjects such attorney to discipline.").
80. Federated Mutual, 456 N.W.2d at 437.
81. MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.4.
82. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that "lawyers are subject to discipline, including suspension and disbar-
ment, for participating in the suppression or destruction of evidence").
83. 692 A.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. 1997).
84. Wilboit, supra note 9, at 651-52.
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IV. DEFENSES To SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
A party who has breached its duty to preserve evidence may fall
back on a number of possible defenses. For example, the spoliator
may argue that it acted in good faith and did not intend to destroy
15discoverable evidence. In addition, the spoliator may also argue
that its conduct caused no harm to the opponent's case because the
spoliated evidence was immaterial to the controversy. s6 Finally, the
spoliator may rely on a "laches" defense where the non-spoliating
party had a reasonable opportunity to independently examine the
missing evidence before it was lost or destroyed.
A. Good Faith
One common defense that is raised by parties who are accused
of spoliation is good faith. Traditionally, courts have been recep-
tive to this argument where the non-spoliating party seeks an ad-
verse evidentiary inference, reasoning that mere negligence does
not indicate fraudulent behavior or suppression of the truth. 8
However, there is now a split in authority as to whether this is a
valid defense."" Some courts continue to hold the traditional view
that an adverse inference may only be drawn against the spoliator if
the destruction of evidence was intentional. 9 Under this approach,
"intentional" does not mean merely that the act of destruction or
removal was willful, but rather that the act of destroying or remov-
ing the evidence was done for the purpose of rendering it useless to
the other party in preparing its case. However, other courts have
adopted a different view, holding that reckless or even negligent
conduct is sufficient to warrant an adverse evidentiary inference.9'
85. McGlynn, supra note 23, at 667.
86. Id.
87. 29 Am. Jur. Evidence § 117 (1966); Katz & Muscaro, supra note 24, at 60
n.69 (citing Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 896, 896 (3r Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that evidence accidentally destroyed does not give rise to adverse inference);
Vick v. Texas Employer's Comm., 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5h Cir. 1975) (destruction must
be intentional); INA Aviation Corp. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 695, 700
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (unfavorable inference arises against a spoiler of evidence only if
the destruction is intentional), affd, 610 F.2d 806, 806 (2' d Cir. 1979)).
88. Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
89. E.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 804
(6" Cir. 1999).
90. Id.
91. Kinsler & Maclver, supra note 3, at 776; see, e.g., Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 74-
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Moreover, even where an adverse evidentiary inference is not an
appropriate remedy, other sanctions may still be available to cor-
92rect the effects of unintentional spoliation.
B. No Harm, No Foul
In contrast to "good faith," most if not all courts recognize an
"absence of prejudice" or "absence of causation" defense. In fact,
among those courts that do not recognize good faith as a defense,
prejudice to the non-spoliating party is often cited as the reason
why.9 However, despite this unanimity of opinion, there is consid-
erable disagreement concerning the appropriate causal test in spo-
liation cases. Some courts apply a strict test consistent with tradi-
tional negligence standards, and require the non-spoliating party to
establish that the plaintiff would have won the underlying suit "but• . 94
for" the spoliation. In this regard, causation is not so much a de-
fense as it is an essential element of the spoliation victim's motion
or case. Jurisdictions adopting this view essentially require that the
underlying claim be resolved before the spoliation claim is action-
95able. On the other hand, some courts have adopted a weaker test
that simply requires the non-spoliating party to show that "there is a
reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence, that access to
the evidence which was destroyed or altered, and which was not
otherwise obtainable, would produce evidence favorable to the ob-
jecting party. '' r6 Finally, at least one court has attempted to adopt a
middle ground by engaging in a thoughtful analysis synthesizing
these two approaches. Under this approach, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) the underlying claim was significantly im-
paired due to the spoliation of evidence; (2) a proximate relation-
ship exists between the projected failure of success in the action
92. Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995) (exclusion of
spoliated evidence and related expert testimony is an appropriate remedy even
where such evidence is lost or destroyed through inadvertence or negligence
rather than intentional misconduct) (citing Dillon, 986 F.2d at 267); Himes v.
Woodings-Verona Tool Works, 565 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(same).
93. Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119.
94. Wilhoit, supra note 9, at 646 (citing Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863
S.W.2d 905, 909-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)).
95. Id. See also Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components
Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Minn. 1990).
96. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 804 (6"
Cir. 1999).
97. Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. Ct. App. 1998).
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and the unavailability of the destroyed evidence; and (3) that the
underlying lawsuit would enjoy a significant j ossibility of success if
the spoliated evidence were still in existence.
In the products liability context, the issue of causation or
prejudice is especially relevant because there is generally less of a
need for a specific piece of evidence in design defect cases than in
manufacturing defect cases. As the court noted in Collazo-Santiago
v. Toyota Motor Corp.:100
Clearly, if a product was manufactured defectively, its de-
fect is likely to be particular to the individual product.
Consequently, a party's examination of that product may
be critical to ascertaining, among other things, the pres-
ence of the defect. In design defect cases, however, a
party's examination of the individual product at issue may
be of lesser importance as the design defect alleged can
be seen in other samples of the product.' '
Consequently, so long as the spoliating party is able to provide
a copy of the missing piece of evidence, sanctions are less likely in a
design defect case because it is harder for the injured party to show
prejudice. Nevertheless, examination of the individual product in
question may still be of significant import in certain design defect
cases where, for example, the question of whether the alleged de-
fect or some other factor caused a particular injury is at issue.102
C. Laches
Another defense closely related to the "absence of prejudice"
defense is laches. Generally, a party may not seek to exclude spoli-
ated evidence and related testimony where it had a reasonable op-
portunity to independently examine such evidence before it was
lost or destroyed. Under these circumstances, sanctions are inap-
propriate because the loss of evidence would not have prejudiced
the non-spoliating party but for its own failure to adequately exam-
ine the missing evidence while it was still available. For example, in
98. Id. at 852.
99. Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995) (citing
Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 80 (3rd Cir. 1994)); Hinze v.
Man-Roland, Inc., No. C2-97-1496, 1998 WL 51466, at * I (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
1998) (unpublished opinion).
100. 149 F.3d 23, 23 (1" Cir. 1998).
101. Id. at 29; see also O'Donnell v. Big Yank, Inc., 696 A.2d 846, 849 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1997).
102. Collazo-Santiago, 149 F.3d at 29; see also Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119.
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Henry v. Joseph,05 a Minnesota State Trooper was injured when he
was struck by a minivan after stopping two vehicles for speeding.
The trooper and the State of Minnesota'04 filed a claim against the
defendant, who responded that she had tried to avoid him but that
her brakes had failed. In support of her defense, the defendant
sought to introduce the report of the State's expert, who examined
her brakes the day after the accident and found that they locked up
when they were applied. According to the expert, this problem
could have caused her vehicle to spin as it did immediately prior to
the accident. Two months after the accident, the defendant sold
the minivan, and the trooper sought to exclude the expert's report
on the grounds that the sale of the van constituted spoliation of
evidence. The trial court agreed with the trooper, but on appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed. According to the Court of Appeals,
the State's own expert witness had an opportunity to inspect and
conduct tests on the brakes before the defendant's van was sold,
and, as a result, neither the trooper nor the State suffered any
prejudice.
105
However, where the party in possession of evidence does not
provide the other party with reasonable notice of its claim or de-
fense, the laches defense does not apply. This exception to the la-
ches defense is well-illustrated by the Minnesota Court of Appeals'
holding in Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co.'06 In Hoffman, the plaintiffs
brought a claim against Ford alleging that Hoffman's Taurus auto-
mobile started a fire in his garage. In response, Ford moved for
spoliation sanctions against the plaintiffs on the grounds that they
had destroyed the fire scene and altered the Taurus before Ford
was given an opportunity to conduct its own, independent inspec-
tion. The record showed that the day after the fire, Hoffman made
a phone call to the dealership where he had purchased the vehicle
in order to cancel a service appointment and request copies of the
sales invoice, loan papers, and warranty. During that conversation,
he told the employee that "my new Ford Taurus started on fire in
my garage and burned my whole house down.' ' 7 However, he
never alleged a breach of warranty or indicated that he was making,
103. No. C2-98-181, 1998 WL 481932, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1998).
104. The State's interest arose from its payment of Trooper Henry's medical
expenses. Id. at *2.
105. Id. at *5.
106. 587 N.W.2d 66, 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
107. Id. at 68.
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or might make, a claim. Nor did he request an inspection, a meet-
ing, or any action beyond the delivery of the documents. After this
conversation, neither Hoffman nor his insurer ever contacted the
dealership again. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence in question• • 108
and dismiss the lawsuit. Consequently, it is imperative that par-
ties in possession of evidence that may become the subject of a law-
suit provide reasonable notice to all relevant parties of their claims
or defenses before testing, altering, or moving such evidence.
V. TRENDS
A. Growing Satellite Litigation
Among members of the legal community, there is a strong and
growing perception that spoliation of evidence is a significant prob-
lem. In fact, one survey has found that fifty percent of all litigators
now consider spoliation to be either a frequent or regular occur-109
rence. This perception, regardless of whether or not it is accu-
rate, will almost certainly lead to an increase in spoliation claims
over the next several years. In fact, there is already anecdotal evi-
dence that spoliation is routinely alleged in Texas and other states.
This satellite litigation can, at times, overwhelm the original
litigation and has the potential to impose significant burdens on
judicial administration. 10 For example, in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
Chem. Indus. Ltd.," I the merits of the litigation were put on hold for
two years while the parties fought over spoliation issues. The fight
culminated in a six week mini-trial at which 40 witnesses appeared
and the court was presented with 50 binders full of documents.
Similarly, in another recent lawsuit involving Prudential , the
plaintiffs spoliation allegations triggered a hearing and investiga-
tion that resulted in 52 depositions, including the deposition of
108. Id. at 70-71 (citing Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 585
N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (a simple telephone call to an automobile
dealer from a distraught buyer claiming that her car caused a fire that damaged
her home was insufficient notice to prevent spoliation sanctions); Hirsch v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (notice to manufacturer
that car caught fire from an undetermined cause and that owner made insurance
claim was insufficient notice to manufacturer of claim)).
109. Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence In Civil Litigation: The Need
For Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 793, 793 (1991).
110. See generally Bissel & Holston, supra note 47.
111. 167 F.R.D. 90, 90 (D.Col. 1996).
112. In re Prudential Co. of America Sales Litigation, 169 F.R.D. 598.
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Prudential's CEO, CFO, and General Counsel.
Although these cases obviously represent the exception and
not the rule, they pave the way for other litigants to raise their own,
more limited spoliation claims in the future. Most of these claims
will probably be asserted in good faith, but some may be speculative
or premature, and could be asserted simply for the purpose of ne-
gotiating a favorable settlement. s13 As a result, allegations of spolia-
tion, as well as actual spoliation of evidence, may be used increas-
ingly as a litigation tactic.
B. Heightened Judicial Skepticism
This concern has caused California-the source of the inde-
pendent spoliation tort-to reconsider its position. In Cedars-Sinai
Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court,14 the California Supreme Court over-
ruled the Court of Appeals' decision fourteen years earlier in Smith
v. Superior Court,1 1 5 and held that a party may not bring a separate
cause of action against a litigation adversary for intentional spolia-
tion of evidence where the spoliation was or should have been dis-
covered before the conclusion of the litigation. According to the
court, several factors weighed against recognizing such a claim, in-
cluding (1) the availability of other remedies; (2) the inherently
difficult task of calculating damages; and (3) the prospect of merit-
less spoliation actions.' Shortly thereafter, in Temple Community
Hosp. v. Superior Court,"7 the California Supreme Court extended its
holding in Cedars-Sinai, and declined to recognize a cause of action
for intentional spoliation against a third party. Although the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals still recognizes claims for negligent spolia-
tion, 8 the Cedars-Sinai and Temple Community Hospital decisions cast
a pall over this cause of action as well. 9 Thus, although courts
113. Well-supported charges of spoliation were the critical factor that led Tex-
aco to offer $140 million to the plaintiffs in a recent race discrimination case.
Charges of Spoliation Lead to $140plus Million Settlement of Race Discrimination Case,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1996 at 37.
114. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
115. Id.
116. Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 517-21.
117. 976 P.2d 223, 223 (Cal. 1999).
118. Hernandez v. Garcetti, 68 Cal.App.4th 675, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998);
Johnson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 67 Cal.App.4th 626, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
119. To date, the California Supreme Court has yet to decide upon the viabil-
ity of a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. See Temple Commu-
nity Hosp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 976 P.2d 223, 227 n.3 ("As in Cedars-
Sinai,...we are not called upon to determine whether a tort cause of action will lie
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have taken an increasingly harsh line against spoliators over the last
several years, the trend in favor of recognizing an independent
cause of action for spoliation may be waning. In fact, less than one
month after the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Ce-
dars-Sinai, the Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize an in-
dependent cause of action for either intentional or negligent spo-
liation.120 However, other states continue to recognize the new tort,
and one can expect that litigants across the country will argue for
establishment of the tort.
C. Special Information Age Problems
The proliferation and changing forms of data in our informa-
tion age will also have a bearing on spoliation law. For example, it
is now possible to copy hundreds or even thousands of records
onto a single CD-ROM. Given this technology, it makes sense to al-
low companies to electronically reproduce their records and de-
stroy the originals in order to conserve space. In recognition of
this fact, approximately 36 states have adopted either the current
or former version of the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business
and Public Records as Evidence Act, which allows companies to
preserve evidence in non-paper form.12  Among these states is
Minnesota, whose Act provides as follows:
If any business, institution, member of a profession or call-
ing, or any department or agency of government, in the
regular course of business or activity has kept or recorded
any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or
combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence
or event, and in the regular course of business has caused
any or all of the same to be recorded, copied or repro-
duced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, mi-
crocard, miniature photographic, optical disk imaging, or
other process which accurately reproduces or forms a du-
rable medium for so reproducing the original, the origi-
nal may be destroyed in the regular course of business
unless held in a custodial or fiduciary capacity or unless its
preservation is required by law.
22
for negligent spoliation of evidence, so there is no need to discuss recent cases
cited by the parties discussing such a tort claim.") (citations omitted).
120. Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1998).
121. Kinsler & Maclver, supra note 3, at 779-81.
122. MINN. STAT. § 600.135 (2000).
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Moreover, even among those states that have not adopted the
Uniform Act, preservation of documents in electronic form is
probably allowed because such evidence would be admissible at
trial as a "duplicate" of an original under Rules 1001(4) and 1003
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which have been adopted in the
remaining 16 states. 123 Consequently, less and less information will
be retained in its paper form because there is no logical or legal
reason for companies to retain paper originals where it is more
economical and convenient for them to store the same information
electronically.
The law is not quite as clear-cut regarding whether electronic
documents may be copied onto paper and then deleted. In Arm-
strong v. Executive Office of the President,12 4 the court determined that,
under the Federal Records Act, 12 the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent was required to maintain e-mail not just in printout form, but
in its original electronic form because the electronic version con-
tained computer readable information that might not be reflected
on the printed copies. In the wake of this decision, one commenta-
tor has noted that businesses may now have the obligation to pre-
serve their electronic documents in both hard copy and in paper
form, because the definition of a document under the Federal Re-
cords Act is nearly identical to the definition of a document under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
126
VI. PRACTICE TIPS
Given the significant and expanding remedies for spoliation,
litigants and their attorneys have a strong incentive to preserve evi-
dence in their possession and quickly examine evidence in the pos-
session of other parties. Consistent adherence to the following
guidelines will help minimize the risk of incurring such penalties. 2
123. Kinsler & Maclver, supra note 3, at 781.
124. 810 F. Supp. 335, 339 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 1 F.3d 1274, 1274 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
125. 144 U.S.C. § 3301.
126. Bissel & Holton, supra note 47 (citing J. Hetrick, Spoliation: One of those
Funny Words Lawyers Use... Or a Serious Legal Issue?, 59 The Philadelphia Lawyer 3
(Fall 1996)).
127. The safeguards recommended in the following section generally mirror
those proposed in the following articles and publications: Margaret Mary Meko,
Spoliation: It's Not Worth It?!, LPBAJournal 14 (Fall 1998); Bissell & Holston, supra
note 47; Barton C. Gernander, Dealing with Skeletons in the Closet: Practical Effects of
the Growing Trend Towards Recognition of Tort Actions for Spoliation of Evidence (Spring
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A. Wen Client Is In Possession Of Evidence
Advise your client to securely store all items and file all docu-
ments that are or could be the subject of litigation for at least the
statute of limitations period. If this would be unworkable or exces-
sively burdensome, advise your client to develop and follow a for-
mal document retention policy. Memorialize the legitimate busi-
ness purpose of this policy in writing and inform your client that
adherence to such a policy will not protect it if it "knew or should
have known" that certain documents would become material to
litigation at some point in the future.
Permit only knowledgeable personnel (e.g., legal, patent, tax
or trademark departments) to decide what constitutes foreseeable
litigation and order any suspensions of the document retention
policy. To the extent practicable, communicate all suspensions of
the policy to affected personnel.
If litigation ensues, restrict access to these items and docu-
ments to the parties to the lawsuit and their representatives.
If your client needs to conduct a test that will result in damage
to particular item, seek consent from the other parties. Provide
them with written notice that they may participate in the test, and
document their response. Photograph and videotape the condi-
tion of the item before, during and after testing, especially if the
other parties are not present. Document the testing methodology
and results.
If adverse parties request access to evidence in the possession
of your client, ask them to agree, in writing, to preserve the evi-
dence and refrain from conducting destructive tests without your
client's consent. If they do not agree, obtain a court order that
binds them in this manner.
Request other parties or potential parties to share the costs as-
sociated with storing and safeguarding particular items, or obtain a
court order requiring them to bear these costs.
B. When Another Party Is In Possession
If litigation has not already ensued, put the other party on no-
tice that you may file a claim or defense related to the evidence.
Request the other party, in writing, to preserve the evidence
1995); Katz & Wood, supra note 68; Kinsler & Maclver, supra note 3; and ASTM
Standard E860-97 (1999) (available at http://www.astm.org.html).
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and permit you to inspect it. Document the party's response. If
the other party does not agree to preserve the evidence voluntarily,
move for a court order requiring it to do so.
Examine the evidence as quickly as possible. Photograph and
videotape the evidence, and conduct all necessary tests and inspec-
tions within the deadlines imposed by the other party. If these
deadlines are unreasonable, move for a court order extending the
deadlines.
Request a role in all decisions regarding the storage and pres-
ervation of material evidence, and actively participate in negotia-
tions concerning these issues.
If the other party objects to the cost of preserving the evi-
dence, consider offering to pay part of the storage costs or even
purchasing the evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the new millennium begins, spoliation of evidence remains
in the forefront of products liability law. It continues to provide a
basis for the exclusion of expert testimony and other related evi-
dence. Parties who engage in intentional spoliation may find their
actions dismissed or so altered by their actions that they are impos-
sible to defend. Courts and litigants alike continue to search for
new means to punish spoliation, including the imposition of inde-
pendent tort liability. Products liability practitioners would be well
advised to consider the repercussions of the spoliation of evidence
from the first moment they become involved in a product action.
Steps should be taken to preserve evidence and litigants should be
prepared to vigorously defend or pursue spoliation.
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